Blar i NILF Discussion Papers på forfatter "Berglann, Helge"

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    • Approaching Equilibrium with Tradable Share Permits 

      Berglann, Helge (NILF Discussion Papers;2013-1, Research report, 2013)
      This paper shows that a simple scheme of non-linear taxes coupled with tradable pollution permits can secure the .rst best outcome even in absence of information about abatement costs. Evidence of the existence of a Pareto ...

    • Citizen and consumer attitudes to food and food production in Norway 

      Kvakkestad, Valborg; Refsgaard, Karen; Berglann, Helge (NILF Discussion Papers;2011-2, Research report, 2011-06)
      This ESEE 2011 conference paper examines attitudes to private and public goods and bads from agriculture in Norway with a particular focus on organic agriculture. The issue is based on a survey among 939 Norwegians. The ...

    • Climate gas emissions from food systems – use of LCA analyses 

      Refsgaard, Karen; Bergsdal, Håvard; Pettersen, J.; Berglann, Helge (NILF Discussion Papers;2011-3, Research report, 2011-08)

    • Fisheries Management under Uncertainty using a Hybrid Instrument 

      Berglann, Helge (NILF Discussion Papers;2010-6, Research report, 2010-09)
      This article considers the use of a hybrid instrument to regulate .sheries, comparing this instrument with quantity control and linear taxation in regards to economic yields and the risk of resource deple- tion. Hybrid ...

    • Fiskejuks og forvaltning 

      Berglann, Helge (NILF Discussion Papers;2012-5, Research report, 2012-08)
      Dette essayet omhandler fiskeriforvaltning med utgangspunkt i problemet med fiskejuks. Jeg beskriver det jeg mener er de viktigste årsakene til at ulovligheter kan skje og drøfter noen av de påvirkningsmulighetene som ...

    • Implementing Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation using Tradable Share Permits 

      Berglann, Helge (NILF Discussion Papers;2009-2, Research report, 2009-07)
      This paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm’s income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm’s own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. ...