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dc.contributor.authorBorgen, Svein Ole
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-14T10:54:04Z
dc.date.available2018-06-14T10:54:04Z
dc.date.issued2003-12
dc.identifier.isbn82-7077-539-8
dc.identifier.issn0805-9691
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2501563
dc.description.abstractMany students of cooperative organizations have underscored that cooperatives are plagued by substantial incentive problems, so that members do not bear the full impact of their individual choices. It is argued that incentive problems are inherent in the cooperative form. I claim that the critique needs further clarification. The idea to be advanced here is that the validity of the critique raised from agency theory and property right theory rest with their ex ante assumptions about the nature of cooperative membership. The pivotal point is whether members are essentially ascribed the properties, reasoning and strategies of a rational investor or a rational user.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk forskningnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNILF Working Paper;2003-25
dc.subjectincentivesnb_NO
dc.subjectagency theorynb_NO
dc.subjectproperty rightsnb_NO
dc.subjectagricultural cooperativesnb_NO
dc.subjectJEL Classification: M2, M20nb_NO
dc.titleRethinking incentive problems in cooperative organizationsnb_NO
dc.typeResearch reportnb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Landbruks- og Fiskerifag: 900::Landbruksfag: 910nb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber18nb_NO
dc.source.issue25nb_NO
dc.relation.projectNorsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk forskning: K026nb_NO
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 134251nb_NO
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 147847nb_NO


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