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dc.contributor.authorBerglann, Helge
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-23T14:03:56Z
dc.date.available2018-01-23T14:03:56Z
dc.date.created2018-01-23T14:15:42Z
dc.date.issued2009-07
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2479150
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm’s income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm’s own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. These "shares of total expected output" lower a firm’s tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market. By employing this scheme, the planner only requires knowledge of marginal damage to induce the first-best outcome. Relative to a traditional cap-and-trade approach the system increases expected social welfare. If incentives for strategic behavior in the market exist, their impact may be scaled down.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherNorsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk forskningnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofNILF Discussion Papers
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNILF Discussion Papers;2009-2
dc.subjectSkatteøkonominb_NO
dc.subjectEconomics of Taxationnb_NO
dc.titleImplementing Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation using Tradable Share Permitsnb_NO
dc.typeResearch reportnb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Economics: 212nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber19nb_NO
dc.source.issue2nb_NO
dc.identifier.cristin1550038
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal


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